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Employers Beware: The Missouri Court of
Appeals Takes a Bite Out of the Employment
At-Will Doctrine
Dunn v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In Dunn v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., the Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District of Missouri held that Thomas P. Dunn had presented suffi-
cient evidence to state a cause of action for wrongful discharge for refusing to
engage in conduct and for reporting conduct which he reasonably believed
violated federal securities laws. 2 Dunn continued Missouri's trend of expand-
ing the availability of wrongful discharge actions to at-will employees termi-
nated in contravention of public policy by merely requiring that the employee
"reasonably believe" the instances at issue violate the law.3 This Note argues
that the Eastern District was correct in extending the exception to the em-
ployment at-will doctrine under such circumstances because, in general, the
protections afforded to employees as a result of the policy outweigh any bur-
dens that may fall on employers.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Thomas P. Dunn began working for Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company
("Enterprise") as an accountant in 1986.4 In 1993, Dunn became corporate
comptroller and an officer of the company.5 The following year, Dunn was
given Vice-President officer level status as corporate comptroller, which he
held until his termination on January 4, 2001.6 As the company's comptroller,
Dunn certified each year that Enterprise's financial records were prepared in
accordance with generally-accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). 7 Addi-
tionally, he was responsible for certifying that the financial records were in
accordance with GAAP for initial public offerings ("IPOs"). 8
1. 170 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
2. Id. at 7-11.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4. Enterprise is a privately held company. Id.
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In 1998, Dunn was directed to begin investigating Enterprise's financial
statements and business practices in order to enable Enterprise to prepare for
an IPO.9 Dunn had concerns about certain company practices, including the
imposition of a surcharge on daily rental customers, the billing of customers
for vehicle damage, and the selective licensing of vehicles in certain states.
10
Additionally, Dunn was particularly troubled by the 2% per month rate
of depreciation used by Enterprise on its vehicles."1 Dunn believed that, while
this rate would be acceptable for a privately-held company, a rate of deprecia-
tion of 2% per month for a publicly-held company violated GAAP. 12 Instead,
he believed that GAAP would require Enterprise to lower its depreciation rate
to at least 1.5%.1
3
After a strategic planning meeting in which Enterprise's investment
banker suggested that the company would need to reduce its rate of deprecia-
tion to 1.5% if it were to go public, Dunn decided to take his concern about
the depreciation to upper management. 4 Dunn was told that the company's
depreciation rate would not be lowered, and then, he received a warning and
was placed on probation until November 1999.15
Before it could offer stock to the public, Enterprise was required to file a
Form S-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 16 October
27, 2000, was set as the target date for filing the Form S-1.1 7 As corporate
comptroller, Dunn was responsible for preparing Enterprise's financial state-
ments in accordance with GAAP with respect to the Form S-1.8 In his
memoranda regarding the financial statements, Dunn concluded that Enter-
prise would have to lower its monthly depreciation rate to 1.5%.19 Then, he
discovered that his memoranda were changed without his approval so that
they set forth different conclusions. 20 Enterprise extended its deadline to early
spring of 2001 and changed its rate of monthly depreciation to 1.7%.21 On
January 4, 2001, Dunn was terminated.22
On May 3, 2001, Dunn filed claims for wrongful discharge for failure to







15. Id. at 4-5.
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County. 23 Enterprise moved for a directed verdict with respect to both of
Dunn's claims.24 These motions were initially denied, but during Enterprise's
presentation of its case, the company renewed its motions and the trial court
granted Enterprise a directed verdict on Dunn's claim that he was wrongfully
terminated for refusing to commit an illegal act.25 The case was submitted to
the jury with respect to Dunn's whistleblowing claim, and the jury returned a
$4,000,000 verdict for Dunn. 26 The trial court then granted Enterprise's mo-
tion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and in the altemative, for a
new trial.27
On appeal to the Eastern District, Dunn argued that he had made a sub-
missible case for wrongful discharge based on two of the four public policy
exceptions to the general at-will employment doctrine. 28 First, Dunn argued
that he had a cause of action for wrongful discharge because he was dis-
charged "for refusing to perform an illegal act or an act contrary to a clear
mandate of public policy." 29 Conversely, Enterprise maintained that because
it had not violated any law or requested that Dunn violate any law, Dunn had
failed to make a submissible case for wrongful discharge.3 0 Second, Dunn
argued that he was wrongfully discharged "for blowing the whistle on Enter-
prise for attempting to use accounting methods in connection with its pro-
posed IPO that were not in accordance with GAAP.'' On this point, Enter-
prise argued that the whistleblower exception to the general employment at-
will doctrine requires that the employee report a pre-existing violation of the
law or a clear mandate of public policy.
32
On the first issue, the Eastern District held that when an at-will em-
ployee is fired for reporting or refusing to engage in possible illegal activity,
he or she need not allege or prove that the unlawful act was actually com-






28. Id. Generally, an at-will employee can be terminated with or without cause,
and an at-will employee will not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge unless
the employee is discharged in violation of law or a clear mandate of public policy.
See, e.g., Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). See
infra Part III.
29. Dunn, 170 S.W.3d at 6-7.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 9-10.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 8. The appellate court reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in
part. Id. at 3. The court decided that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict
on Dunn's claim that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of public policy for
refusing to perform an illegal act and in granting Enterprise's motion for directed
2006]
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for reporting conduct that he or she reasonably believes violates a clear man-
date of public policy, he or she can make a submissible case of retaliatory
discharge under the whistleblower exception.
34
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of the At-Will Employment Doctrine
Missouri's employment law is grounded in the employment at-will doc-
trine, and thus it generally allows employers to discharge employees with or
without cause. 35 This doctrine originated in the United States36 and is not
followed in most Western European countries. 37 Commentators generally
agree that the birth of employment at-will as the dominant rule in the United
States was in 1877 with Professor Wood's treatise on master-servant law.
38
verdict on Dunn's claim that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of public
policy under the whistleblower exception when he reported Enterprise's attempted
use of accounting methods in connection with its proposed IPO that did not follow
GAAP. Id. at 7-12.
34. Id. at 10-11. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of Enter-
prise's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Dunn's claim that he blew
the whistle on the illegal business practices of Enterprise. Id. at 11.
35. See Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985) ("Under Missouri's
employment at will doctrine an employer can discharge--for cause or without
cause--an at will employee .... ). Of course, when an employee has an employ-
ment contract with his or her employer, that employee is not an employee at-will,
but is an employee with a contract. See Timothy J. Heinsz, The Assault of the Em-
ployment at Will Doctrine: Management Considerations, 48 Mo. L. REv. 855, 861
(1983). Therefore, the contract governs the terms and conditions of his or her
employment. Id. ("If an employee wished to prevent termination at will, he
needed to seek contractual protection from his employer.").
36. See generally James E. Meadows, Dancing Around Employment At-Will:
Can Fraud Provide Plaintiffs a Way to Hold Their Employers Liable?, 65 Mo. L.
REv. 1003, 1007-11 (2000) (providing a helpful history of the employment at-will
doctrine).
37. Heinsz, supra note 35, at 862 ("France, Germany, Great Britain, and Swe-
den have laws against unjust dismissals.").
38. See Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Ap-
proach, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 520 (2004); see also Heinsz, supra note 35, at 859.
[T]he "rule" laid down by Wood states that a hiring in which no duration
is expressed is presumed to be terminable at will, although plaintiff re-
mains free to prove that the contract was otherwise. Further, the fact that
the hiring states a rate of pay-so much per month or per year--does not,
in and of itself, rebut this presumption or establish that the parties in-
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Following publication of Wood's treatise, "employment at will has had an
impressive one hundred year reign: every state in the United States adhered to
the employment at will rule with virtually no wrongful discharge excep-
tions." 39 Furthermore, "it had been generally accepted that for all of its diffi-
culties and challenges, the system of employment at will we had inherited in
this country was the appropriate one.
' '4
The at-will employment doctrine was not viewed as harsh to employees
for several reasons:
An individual's employment relationship with any one employer
was seldom of long term economic significance. The cultural fron-
tier mentality and the burgeoning variety of commercial enterprises
led to an expectation of personal mobility and entrepreneurial in-
stability. The widespread agrarian base of society allowed for
much more seasonal and part-time employment. Most important,..
• long-term economic security in the sense of provision for subsis-
tence, food, shelter, medical care, disability protection and retire-
ment or old-age "insurance" was self-insured by the family institu-
tion, the basic personal protection unit of society.
41
However, during the middle of the twentieth century, courts began to
carve out exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine. 42 Throughout the
1970s and 1980s, commentators began toargue that employment at-will "in-
sufficiently accounted for the realities of the modem workplace, characterized
by an increased dependence of employees on employers, a reduced availabil-
ity of employees to use the labor market to their advantage, and a decreased
Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule"
Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 553 (1990).
39. Bird, supra note 38, at 520. Currently, the only state in which employment
at-will is not the default rule is Montana. Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act,
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 915 (2003); see generally Marc Jarsulic, Protect-
ing Workers from Wrongful Discharge: Montana's Experience with Tort and Statu-
tory Regimes, 3 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 105 (1999).
40. Walter Olson, The Trouble With Employment Law, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
32, 32 (1999).
41. (45) Joan M. Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the
Modern At Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REv. 189, 191 (1983).
42. (46) See, e.g., Olson, supra note 40, at 32 (contending that Lawrence Blades'
1967 Columbia Law Review article "kicked off the modem revolution in state em-
ployment law"). See also Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388
(Conn. 1980) ("We are ... mindful that the myriad of employees without the bar-
gaining power to command employment contracts for a definite term are entitled
to a modicum of judicial protection when their conduct as good citizens is pun-
ished by their employers.").
2006)
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number and power of collective bargaining agreements."43 In responding to
these voluminous criticisms, courts began to create public policy exceptions
to the employment at-will doctrine.
44
This pro-employee trend in the courts has not been universally ap-
plauded, however, as some have maintained that at-will employment relation-
ships should not be interfered with by courts. Indeed, "[t]he cure is in many
respects worse than the disease."45 Furthermore, the possible injustices to
employees precipitated by an at-will employment relationship are grossly
overestimated, and as one commentator notes, "[a]rbitrary firings of deserv-
ing individuals abound; only the state can deliver these helpless victims from
the clutches of their capitalist masters. This picture is, of course, nonsense.
' ' 6
Defenders of the at-will employment doctrine have historically argued
that employers and employees very rarely alter the default at-will employ-
ment relationship, and because at-will employment is the dominant employ-
ment scheme, its desirability to the parties is thus reflected.4 7 Assuming that
43. Bird, supra note 41, at 521. One court explained the justification for excep-
tions to the employment at-will doctrine as follows:
[11n a civilized state where reciprocal legal rights and duties abound
the words "at will" can never mean "without limit or qualification,"..
• for in such a state the rights of each person are necessarily and inher-
ently limited by the rights of others and the interests of the public. An
at will prerogative without limits could be suffered only in an anarchy,
and there not for long-it certainly cannot be suffered in a society
such as ours without weakening the bond of counterbalancing rights
and obligations that holds such societies together. Thus, while there
may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an
arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a
contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public pol-
icy. A different interpretation would encourage and sanction lawless-
ness, which law by its very nature is designed to discourage and pre-
vent.
Sides v. Duke Univ., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
44. Bird, supra note 41, at 521-22. Between 1979 and 1988, the number of
states incorporating the public policy exception to employment at-will more than
tripled. From 1984 to 1986, more than five states per year recognized the public
policy exception to employment at will for the first time. Similarly, between 1980
and 1987, judicial approval of the implied contract exception increased from
fewer than ten states to nearly forty. In just seven years, courts and commentators
transformed the at-will rule from a dominant workplace rule to one constrained
with exceptions prohibiting outrageous employer conduct. Id.
45. Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire
Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901, 1933 (1996).
46. Id. at 1902.
47. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Em-
ployment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WiS. L. REV. 837, 838
(1995); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
[Vol. 71
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the parties desire an employment at-will relationship,48 one is left to decide
whether the underlying rationale of the at-will employment doctrine is de-
feated when an employee is terminated for refusing to engage in what the
employee reasonably believes is illegal behavior, or for blowing the whistle
on such behavior.
Defenders of the at-will employment doctrine also note the economic ef-
ficiency of the at-will employment doctrine. 4 9 Furthermore, the employment
at-will doctrine "was based on a moral proposition that was intuitively easy to
grasp, namely that a job ought to be voluntary on both sides. If it isn't work-
ing out, it should at some point end rather than continuing forever against the
will of one side."50
An exception to the at-will employment doctrine was first enunciated by
a Missouri court, though not in public policy terms, in 1963 by the Missouri
Supreme Court in Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home."' In Smith, the
plaintiff argued that he was wrongfully terminated for engaging in union ac-
tivity.52 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, holding that "an employer may
not discharge an employee for asserting the constitutional right thereby given
947, 948 (1984) ("The survival of the contract at will, and the frequency of its use in
private markets, might well be taken as a sign of its suitability for employment rela-
tions.").
48. See Jesse Rudy, What They Don't Know Won't Hurt Them: Defending Em-
ployment-At- Will in Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Posses Just Cause
Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 307 (2002) (citing statistical data, to ar-
gue that most employees are not even aware of their at-will employee status, and
concluding that the at-will employment doctrine represents the best available em-
ployment model because requiring just cause for termination would ultimately harm
employees more than help them).
My conclusion is that non-legal, behavior-directing mechanisms already
provide optimal deterrence to arbitrary discharges in the absence of a just
cause legal rule. Both the "no discharge without cause" norm and the em-
ployer's own wealth-maximizing incentives prevent an employer from
discharging an employee without cause, regardless of whether the legal
rule is at-will or just cause.
Id. at 359.
49. Epstein, supra note 47, at 982 ("No system of regulation can hope to match
the benefits that the contract at will affords in employment relations. The flexibility
afforded by the contract at will permits the ceaseless marginal adjustments that are
necessary in any ongoing productive activity conducted, as all activities are, in condi-
tions of technological and business change.... Here, a full analysis of the relevant
costs and benefits shows why the constant minor imperfections of the market, far
from being a reason to oust private agreements, offer the most powerful reason for
respecting them."). See also Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad
Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1901 (1996) (arguing
that the judiciary is ill-equipped to address the issue ofjob security).
50. Olson, supra note 40, at 32.
51. 370 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1963).
52. Id. at 252.
2006]
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him to choose collective bargaining representatives to bargain for him con-
ceming his employment." 53 Thus, the first exception to the Missouri at-will
employment doctrine was created: "at-will employees terminated for exercis-
ing a constitutional right, such as appointing a union representative for collec-
tive bargaining purposes, have available a wrongful discharge cause of ac-
tion.
, 54
The second Missouri case to find an exception to the at-will employ-
ment doctrine was Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co. 55 There, the
Missouri Supreme Court held that an employee had a cause of action where
the employee was discharged for exercising his right to file a claim under the
worker's compensation statute. 56 The worker's compensation statute itself
prohibits firing an employee because the employee files a claim under the
statute.
57
In 1985, the Missouri Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to the
employment at-will doctrine in Dake v. Tuell.58 In Dake, employees at-
tempted to bring a wrongful discharge action "by cloaking their claims in the
misty shroud of prima facie tort."59 The employees alleged that they were
fired for informing their managers that other employees were making fraudu-
lent representations to customers. 60 The supreme court dismissed the plain-
tiffs' petition for failure to state a cause of action, declining to establish "a
53. Id. at 254. See MO. CONST. art. I, § 29 ("That employees shall have the
right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.").
54. Joseph H. Knittig, Everything You Wanted to Know About Missouri's Public
Policy Exception But Didn't Know You Should Ask, 61 Mo. L. REv. 949, 951 (1996).
55. 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
56. Id. at 276. The worker's compensation statute provides: "No employer or
agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any employee for exer-
cising any of his rights under this chapter. Any employee who has been dis-
charged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages against his
employer." Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2000). The Hansome court enumerated a
four-part test an employee must meet to state a claim for retaliatory discharge: "(1)
plaintiff's status as employee of defendant before injury, (2) plaintiffs exercise
of a right granted by Chapter 287, (3) employer's discharge of or discrimination
against plaintiff, and (4) an exclusive causal relationship between plaintiff's ac-
tions and defendant's actions." Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275. "[The] exclusive
causal relationship between the employee's exercise of his right ... and the dis-
charge .... has been an extremely difficult burden for an employee to meet."
James W. Riner, Daniel N. McPherson & Brian D. Byrd, Wrongful Discharge of At-
Will Employees in Missouri, 59 J. Mo. B. 34,37 (2003).
57. Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 875.
58. 687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1985).
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rule that would permit an at will employee to bring an action for wrongful
discharge under the guise of the prima facie tort doctrine.'
In Dake, Judge Blackmar filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed
with the court's result, but disagreed with the majority's attempt to "establish
an ironclad rule that there may be no action for wrongful termination in the
absence of contract or statute.'" 2 He encouraged plaintiffs' attorneys to keep
trying, and stated that while the majority opinion tended to inhibit the com-
mon law process with regard to wrongful termination, he hoped "that future
courts realize that [the Dake decision] is authoritative only" on its facts.63 As
the next section illustrates, many courts have heeded Judge Blackmar's ad-
vice, as more exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine have been recog-
nized.64
B. The Modern Public Policy Exceptions
The modern Missouri doctrine of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy has evolved into four distinct classes of conduct for which an
employee cannot be discharged:
(1) refusing to perform an illegal act or an act contrary to a strong
mandate of public policy; (2) reporting wrongdoing or violations of
law or public policy by the employer or fellow employees to supe-
riors or third parties; (3) acting in a manner public policy would
encourage, such as performing jury duty, seeking public office, or
joining a labor union; or (4) filing a workers' compensation
claim.
65
In 1989, the Western District Missouri Court of Appeals, in Crocket v.
Mid-America Health Services,66 announced that "[t]he public policy excep-
tion to the employment at will doctrine is narrow, and a plaintiff who seeks to
come within its scope must expressly plead that his employer has discharged
him because of his refusal to violate the law."
67
61. Id. at 193.
62. Id. at 194 (Blackmar, J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. See infra Part III.B.
65. Porter v. Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 936-37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(citing Boyle v. Vista Eyewear Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 873-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).
The third and fourth exceptions will not be discussed in this Note, because they are
not relevant to the instant case. For further information about the third and fourth
exceptions, see Riner, supra note 59, at 36-38.
66. 780 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
67. Id. at 658 (citation omitted).
2006]
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1. Refusing to Perform an Illegal Act or an Act Contrary to a Clear
Mandate of Public Policy
The first exception to the at-will employment doctrine, refusal to engage
in an unlawful act or act against a clear mandate of public policy, states that
the employer must require the employee to engage in conduct that violates a
constitutional provision, a statute, an ordinance, or a regulation.6" This rule
was articulated one year after Dake,69 in Beasley v. Affiliated Hospital Prod-
ucts.
70
In Beasley, an employee brought a wrongful discharge action for his
termination, which was the result of his refusal to fraudulently predetermine
the winners of an advertised raffle of hospital equipment donated and manu-
factured by his employer.71 The employee claimed that by following his man-
ager's orders, he would have violated both state and federal criminal laws.
72
Thus, the Eastern District held that the employee had stated a cause of action
under the first public policy exception.
73
In 1988, in Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation,74 the Missouri
Supreme Court did not "deem it necessary to engraft a so-called 'public pol-
icy' exception onto the employment at will doctrine."75 In McDonnell Doug-
las, an employee was fired for missing work after she attended a deposition.
76
She argued that a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine
should allow her to state a claim for wrongful discharge. 7 7 In distinguishing
Smith, 7 Boyle,79 and Beasley,80 the court noted that in each of those cases, a
"statute, regulation based on a statute, or constitutional provision [was] impli-
cated."8' In Johnson's case, because no such statute, regulation, or constitu-
68. Riner, supra note 56, at 35.
69. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
70. 713 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
71. Id. at 559.
72. Id. Plaintiff alleged that fraudulently predetermining the raffle winners would
violate: "§ 570.140 RSMo [Deceptive Business Practice]; § 570.150 RSMo [Com-
mercial Bribery]; § 570.160 RSMo [Bait Advertising, False Advertising]; Title 18
U.S.C. § 1341 [Mail Fraud]; and Title 18 U.S.C. § 1343 [Wire Fraud]." Id.
73. Id. at 561.
74. 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
75. Id. at 663.
76. Id. at 662.
77. Id. at 662-63.
78. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
81. McDonnell Douglas, 745 S.W.2d at 663.
[Vol. 71
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tional provision gave her the right to attend a deposition, the court rejected
her claim for wrongful discharge.
82
In Johnson v. World Color Press, Inc.,83 an employee alleged that he
was discharged in retaliation for opposing accounting practices that he be-
lieved violated federal securities laws. After initially determining that public
policy includes federal law, the court pointed out that federal securities regu-
lations were "designed to provide investors with full disclosure... to protect
investors against fraud, and to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair
dealing." 85 Accordingly, the court found that "public policy favors full disclo-
sure, truthfulness and accuracy in the financial reports made by businesses to
the government and to the public, and that an employee who voices objection
to practices which he reasonably believes violate this policy should be pro-
tected from being discharged." Finally, the court held that the plaintiff was
not required to plead conclusively that federal securities laws were violated.87
82. Id. at 663-66 (Blackmar, J., dissenting) (arguing that summary judgment was
inappropriate because the employee may have had a contractual employment relation-
ship with the employer based on the employee handbook). One of the first cases to
recognize a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine involved the
employee and judicial proceedings. Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that an employee stated a cause of
action when he was terminated by his employer for disobeying orders to commit
perjury).
83. 498 N.E.2d 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
84. Id. at 576.
85. Id. at 577.
86. Id. at 578.
87. Id. The court explained that "an employee with a reasonable belief that ille-
gal activity is occurring should be able to report his belief to his superiors in an effort
to ensure management's compliance with the law without fear of discharge." Id. De-
fendants made the argument that "the tort of retaliatory discharge is designed to pro-
tect lower level employees and not high level managers such as plaintiff." Id. at 580.
The court replied, "[w]e decline defendants' invitation to create a class of employees
who are excluded from recovering under retaliatory discharge." Id.
However, New York requires an actual violation of a law. Although, the
court in New York based its decision in Bordell v. General Electric Company on
statutory interpretation rather than on public policy or judicial precedent. 208 A.D.2d
219, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). In Bordell, the employee alleged that seven fellow
employees had possibly been exposed to significant levels of radiation, requiring the
employee to report the incident to the authorities, and that he was terminated for voic-
ing his concerns. Id. at 220. Basing its analysis on the interpretation of a state labor
statute, the New York court held that the employee did not have a cause of action
unless an actual law was violated. Id. at 221.
On the other hand, as the Oregon Court of Appeals in McQuary v. Bel Air
Convalescent Home, Inc., stated, "the social harm from reporting in good faith a com-
plaint that may turn out, after investigation, to be unfounded is potentially far less
than the harm of not reporting a well-founded complaint for fear of the conse-
quences." 684 P.2d 21, 24 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). The court added that "[t]he social
2006]
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2. The Whistleblower Exception: Reporting Employer Wrongdoing"8
The whistleblower exception was first recognized by the Western Dis-
trict of the Missouri Court of Appeals in the 1985 case, Boyle v. Vista Eye-
wear, Inc.8 9 This exception provides relief for "at will employees terminated
for reporting an employer's violation of the law as found in a statute or regu-
lation based on a statute, such as the violation of an FDA regulation."
90
In Boyle, an employee brought a wrongful discharge claim against her
employer, alleging that the employer fired her because she warned her em-
ployer that if it did not follow federal regulations in its manufacture of eye-
glasses, she would notify authorities of her employer's practice of falsely
attesting to the hardening and testing of eyeglass lenses.9' Ultimately, the
benefit from investigating all potentially significant violations of a patient's statutory
rights is far greater than the social benefit, if any, from allowing an employer to ter-
minate an employe [sic] who in good faith reports to the appropriate authorities situa-
tions which prove not to be violations." Id.
88. For a helpful discussion of the whistleblower exception as applied by the
states generally, see Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State
of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 99 (2000). Not all jurisdictions
extend the public policy exception to whistleblowers. See, e.g., Sabine Pilot Serv.,
Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (allowing exception only for employees
terminated for refusing to perform an illegal act).
We now hold that public policy, as expressed in the laws of this state and
the United States which carry criminal penalties, requires a very narrow
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine announced in East Line &
R.R.R. Co. v. Scott. That narrow exception covers only the discharge of an
employee for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an ille-
gal act.
Id. at 735.
89. 700 S.W.2d 859, 870-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("[W]here an employer has
discharged an at-will employee because that employee refused to violate the law
or any well established and clear mandate of public policy as expressed in the
constitution, statutes and regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, or because
the employee reported to his superiors or to public authorities serious midconduct
[sic] that constitutes violations of the law and of such well established and clearly
mandated public policy, the employee has a cause of action in tort for damages
for wrongful discharge."). Judge Berrey dissented. Id. at 878 (Berry, J., dissenting)
("In view of the recent pronouncement regarding discharge of at will employees as set
forth in Dake v. Tuell, I must dissent.") (citation omitted).
90. Knittig, supra note 54, at 955.
91. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 870. The employee alleged her employer was violating
21 C.F.R. § 801.4 10, which provides in pertinent part:
In the impact test, a 5/8 -inch steel ball weighing approximately 0.56
ounce is dropped from a height of 50 inches upon the horizontal upper
surface of the lens. The ball shall strike within a 5/8 -inch diameter circle
located at the geometric center of the lens. The ball may be guided but not
restricted in its fall by being dropped through a tube extending to within
[Vol. 71
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court held that employers "are not free to require employees, on pain of los-
ing their jobs, to commit unlawful acts or acts in violation of a clear mandate
of public policy expressed in the constitution, statutes and regulations prom-
ulgated pursuant to statute."
92
Often, an issue in whistleblower cases is whether the employee has re-
ported the wrongdoing to the appropriate persons. In Adcock v. Newton,
Inc. ,93 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held that for the
whistleblower exception to apply, the employee must report the violation to
proper authorities, such as "law enforcement authorities or employer security
persons." 94 Then, in Faust v. Ryder Commercial Leasing & Services,95 the
Western District held that an employee's report of wrongdoing to the wrong-
doer itself did not afford the employee the protection of the whistleblower
exception.
96
However, in Lynch v. Blanke Baer & Bowey Krimko, Inc., 97 the Eastern
District explicitly held that the whistleblower exception will apply if notifica-
tion is given to "proper" company authorities. In Lynch, an employer argued
that the whistleblower exception did not apply, because an employee did not
"report or threaten to report his concerns to any outside agency or to the
FDA." 99 The Eastern District rejected this argument, pointing to Boyle's in-
struction "that plaintiff report[] violations to his superiors."''  Thus, an em-
approximately 4 inches of the lens. To pass the test, the lens must not frac-
ture; for the purpose of this section, a lens will be considered to have frac-
tured if it cracks through its entire thickness, including a laminar layer, if
any, and across a complete diameter into two or more separate pieces, or
if any lens material visible to the naked eyes becomes detached from the
ocular surface.
Id. at 871; see also 21 C.F.R. § 801.410(d)(2).
92. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 877.
93. 939 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
94. Id. at 429 ("Adcock never reported any illegal or unethical conduct to the
proper authorities .... He merely wrote a note to a fellow employee questioning the
wisdom of paying a secretary for hours she did not work.").
95. 954 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
96. Id. at 391 (The court decided that reporting wrongdoing to the perpetrator of
the wrongdoing was, in effect, a "courtesy warning" and that "[ilt allows wrongdoers
to escape detection and avoid prosecution for past wrongdoing, while in no way
affording the victims an opportunity to protect themselves from further wrongdo-
ing, all contrary to the clear mandate of public policy implicated here.").
97. 901 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
98. Id. at 150-51.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 151. The relevant portion of Boyle states that "where an employer has
discharged an at will employee... because the employee reported to his superiors...
serious misdonduct [sic] that constitutes violations of the law and of such well estab-
lished and clearly mandated public policy, the employee has a cause of action." Boyle
v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 878 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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ployee will be protected by the whistleblower exception if the employee re-
ports wrongdoing to a superior who does not also happen to be the main per-
petrator of the wrongdoing or illegal act.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Dunn v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., °10 the Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District of Missouri had to decide whether Dunn would be protected
by the public policy exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine, even
though Enterprise did not ultimately violate the law in the filing of its IPO. 102
Judge Booker T. Shaw, writing for a unanimous court, noted that no Missouri
case had directly dealt with this issue, but that the Illinois Court of Appeals
for the Fifth District had ruled on this issue with similar facts in Johnson v.
World Color Press, Inc. 1
03
First, the Dunn court addressed the "refusal to perform an illegal act"
public policy exception. The Eastern District found that Dunn had presented
evidence that he was in charge of preparing Enterprise's financial statements
for its IPO, and that Enterprise had requested that he prepare those statements
in a fashion that led Dunn to believe that GAAP were not being followed, in
violation of federal securities regulations. 1° 4 Furthermore, according to the
court, Dunn had presented evidence showing that he was terminated for his
refusal to comply with Enterprise's instructions on preparing its financial
statements.10 5 Thus, the Eastern District agreed with the reasoning of the Illi-
nois Court of Appeals in World Color Press."6
Although Enterprise contended that Dunn's actions would not have vio-
lated the law and that no law was ever violated, the court found that because
Dunn reasonably believed that following Enterprise's directives would have
resulted in a violation of the law or a clear mandate of public policy, "it was
not necessary for him to 'allege or prove conclusively the law has been vio-
lated in order to state a cause of action."'' 10 7 Furthermore, the court explained
that because Dunn "may have been instrumental in helping to prevent what he
reasonably believed to be an unlawful act, he should be protected by the law
101. 170 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
102. Id. at 7.
103. 498 N.E.2d 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
104. Dunn, 170 S.W.3d at 7.
105. Id.
106. Id. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
107. Dunn, 170 S.W.3d at 9 (quoting Johnson v. World Color Press, Inc., 498
N.E.2d 575, 578 (II. App. Ct. 1986)). Although employees such as Dunn are not
required to know exactly what the law is, their employers have been held to know
what the law is. Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 877 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) ("The employer is bound to know the public policies of the state and nation as
expressed in their constitutions, statutes, judicial decisions and administrative regula-
tions, particularly, as here, those bearing directly upon the employer's business.").
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for his efforts."' 08 Thus, the court reasoned that the fact that Enterprise did
not ultimately violate any law for failing to follow GAAP did not defeat
Dunn's claim of retaliatory discharge.' ° 9 Therefore, the court held that Dunn
had alleged a submissible case under the first public policy exception to the
employment at-will doctrine." 1
0
Regarding the whistleblower exception to the employment at-will doc-
trine, the court employed similar reasoning. First, the court noted that public
policy "encourage[s] employees to report suspected wrongdoing by co-
workers.""' The court also stated that "[p]ublic policy would certainly not be
served by requiring an employee to wait until his or her employer completes
the unlawful act before reporting it and before being protected by the whistle-
blower exception to the employment at-will doctrine." 1 2 The court found that
even though Enterprise postponed its IPO and did not ultimately violate fed-
eral securities regulations, Dunn should still be protected by the public policy
exception to the employment at-will doctrine." 3
V. COMMENT
The Eastern District's decision in Dunn is in line with the majority of
state court decisions in that it does not require an actual violation of law to
trigger the first two public policy exceptions to the employment at-will doc-
trine."14 Unconstrained by contrary statutes, as was the case in Bordell, the
Dunn court held that "[p]ublic policy would certainly not be served by requir-
ing an employee to wait until his or her employer completes the unlawful act
before reporting it and before being protected by the whistleblower exception
to the employment at-will doctrine.""
' 15
In Dunn, the court found that the policies for exceptions to the at-will
employment rule outweighed competing policies attempting to justify the at-
will employment doctrine." 6 Limiting the illegal activities of employers is
best achieved, as the Eastern District noted, by protecting employees who are
"terminated from... employment for objecting to practices [they] reasonably
believe[] violate this policy.""17 The logic of this assertion is intuitively valid
108. Dunn, 170 S.W.3d. at 9.
109. Id. at 8.
110. Id. at9.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See generally Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 91, at 120-22.
115. Dunn, 170 S.W.3d at 10.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 8.
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and has also been articulated by several other courts. 118 While the utility of
the employment at-will doctrine is shown by its status as the traditional
American employment scheme and the fact that it is economically efficient,
when an employer attempts to violate the law, these positive aspects of the
employment at-will doctrine are defeated by the concerns of the employee
who does the right thing by either refusing to partake in the illegal activity or
by blowing the whistle on such activity. Accordingly, the employee who does
the right thing should not be terminated for disobeying his or her employer
under such circumstances.
Additionally, many of the original justifications for the employment at-
will doctrine no longer exist. Modem employment relationships are predomi-
nately long term, the majority of our economy is no longer agriculturally
based, and long term economic security is now provided by the employer.
119
Because of these modem realities, many commentators have criticized the
employment at-will doctrine as anachronistic.' 20 While this Note does not
contend that the employment at-will doctrine should be entirely abandoned,
the existence of the argument that the employment at-will doctrine has out-
lived its usefulness supports the proposition that the public policy exceptions
support the court's decision in Dunn, which solidified the extension of these
various exceptions to cases where the employee is fired for refusing to violate
the law or reporting activity that he reasonably believes violates the law.
Hopefully, the ramifications of the Dunn opinion will encourage em-
ployees to both refuse employers' orders to break the law and to blow the
whistle on employers' wrongdoing. There are, however, possible negative
effects of the Eastern District's decision. Increasing the availability of these
causes of action will undoubtedly lead to increased court costs for employers.
For example, it is possible the courts will be flooded by litigation, with em-
ployees making tenuous arguments about their "reasonable belief' about the
legality of a particular issue.
118. See, e.g., Belline v. K-Mart Corp, 940 F.2d 184, 188 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[A]n
employee's retaliatory discharge claim should not turn on the happenstance of
whether the irregular conduct she reports is actually criminal."); Palmer v. Brown,
752 P.2d 685, 689-90 (Kan. 1988) ("[W]e have no hesitation in holding termination
of an employee in retaliation for the good faith reporting of a serious infraction of
such rules, regulations, or the law by a co-worker or an employer to either com-
pany management or law enforcement officials (whistle-blowing) is an actionable
tort."); Johnson v. World Color Press, Inc., 498 N.E.2d 575, 577-78 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986).
119. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Lisa J. Beret, Wrongful Discharge of Independent Contractors:
A Source-Derivative Approach to Deciding Who May Bring a Claim for Violation
of Public Policy, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 39 (2000).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In extending the protection of public policy exceptions to at-will em-
ployees who reasonably believe that their employers might be involved in
illegal conduct, Dunn took a positive step in helping to protect employees and
society from employers' wrongdoing. Charging an employee with knowing
precisely when the law is violated would be both illogical and unfair. In
Dunn, the Eastern District signaled that employers cannot terminate at-will
employees for refusing to follow orders to engage in potentially illegal con-
duct. Hopefully this decision will cause employers to act legally and if they
do not, allow employees to stand up to employers by refusing to engage in
wrongdoing, or by reporting such misconduct.
DANIEL P. O'DONNELL, JR.
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